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Abstract 
 
Compared with most other EU member states, the UK has a relatively low rate of 
recycling of household waste, and sends a relatively high proportion to disposal in 
landfill. Under the provisions of the EU Landfill Directive, this situation will have to 
change radically in the next ten years, with much less waste being sent to landfill, in a 
context in which the quantity of household waste continues to increase at about 3% 
per year. A number of national policy documents have in recent years proposed how 
this challenge might be addressed, most recently the report from the Strategy Unit in 
2002, Waste Not, Want Not. 
 
Analysis in the Strategy Unit report suggests that, however the UK disposes of its 
waste in the coming years, and in the absence of waste reduction measures, waste 
disposal costs are likely to double to £3.2 billion by 2020. The increase will be much 
greater if the landfill tax increases from its current rate of £14 per tonne (for active 
waste) to £35 per tonne in the medium term, as announced by the Chancellor in the 
2003 Budget. 
 
At present households pay for waste collection and disposal through the Council Tax. 
Because the Council Tax is regressive (the charge is proportionately greater for poor 
households), increasing Council Tax to pay for higher waste costs will also be 
regressive. Moreover, the increase in charges would, like the current flat-rate waste 
disposal charge, do nothing to incentivise householders either to reduce their waste 
or to cooperate with recycling schemes. 
 
The Strategy Unit recommended that local authorities should be able to introduce 
variable waste charging, not least to provide an incentive for both kinds of behaviour. 
Experience in other countries has shown that it can be expected to result in both 
waste reduction and an increase in the separation of recyclables. There are four 
possible approaches to variable waste charging: bag or tag/sticker schemes, volume-
based schemes, frequency-based schemes and weight-based schemes. A comparison of 
international experience suggests that weight-based schemes are most successful in 
achieving waste reduction. In some cases these have been able to reduce waste such 
that their higher cost than the other schemes is more than offset, so that they become 2 
the cheapest scheme as well as the most effective in changing behaviour. However, 
this cannot be guaranteed, and there are many factors to be taken into account in 
considering which scheme should be introduced in different circumstances. 
 
A potential concern about the introduction of variable waste charging in the UK is 
that it might have a disproportionate impact on poor households (as would an 
increase in Council Tax, as noted above), because the generation of household waste 
bears little relation to income, and more affluent households tend to recycle more, 
thereby reducing their residual waste which would bear the charge. 
 
If waste charging was removed from Council Tax by reducing the Council Tax for all 
households by the same amount (the average per household cost of waste collection 
and disposal), this would be progressive (i.e. poorer households would be 
proportionately better off compared to richer households). If a revenue-neutral 
variable weight-based charge was then introduced for all households, and there was 
no waste reduction, 92% of single-person households, and 76% of two-person 
households, would be better off, while most larger households would be net losers. 
Clearly more households of all sizes would be losers if the charges were set at a level 
to raise more revenue than is paid at present through the Council Tax, in order to 
cover the extra costs of increased recycling. 
 
If the recycling rate was raised to around 30%, the average cost per household would 
rise to about £70 per year. If there was variable waste charging then less waste would 
be produced and a recycling rate of around 45% could be achieved for about £70 per 
year (Eunomia Research and Consulting 2003). Since the present costs of household 
waste management are about £1.2 billion per year, that is equivalent to an increase of 
about £500 million to £1.7 billion per year. As the Strategy Unit recognised, at least 
this kind of increase in expenditure will be necessary in order to meet the 
requirements of the Landfill Directive. If this increase in expenditure was to be funded 
through Council Tax at the same proportions of local to central government revenues 
as at present, central government would need to fund £375 million (three quarters) of 
the £500 million increase. 
 3 
The amount of waste that households produce varies according to size. If it is 
assumed, as discussed above, that average waste costs will rise to £70 per year and 
the charges are per kilogram of residual waste then on average one-person 
households will pay £43 and on average couples will pay £56. If we assume that they 
have on average received a deduction of £50 in their Council Tax bill, the result is a 
difference of less than 15p per week either way. 
 
In order to protect larger low-income households, it would be necessary to provide 
extra benefits for additional members. To compensate, 50p per week could be added 
to Child Tax Credit for all families on benefits and low to medium incomes at a cost 
of approximately £165 million per annum. If the objective was to ensure that all but 
the 20% of low-income households with the highest waste production among 
households of their size and composition did not lose out, there could be increases in 
means-tested benefits and tax credits of a further £200 million per annum, to a total of 
£365 million. 
 
It may be noted that, under this scheme, central government would be spending 
through the benefits system about the same as the £375 million it would need to spend 
in support grants to local authorities to cover the additional costs of higher recycling  
rates, if these were to be funded through Council Tax. 
 
Of course, all households could reduce their waste disposal costs by reducing the 
amount of residual waste they generate, both by producing less waste in the first 
place and by separating out more waste for recycling. If these effects were 
pronounced (especially the former), then it is quite possible, on the basis of 
experience in other countries, that total waste disposal costs, and therefore total 
waste charges, would fall from their present level, thereby significantly reducing 
concerns about regressivity from the change in the charging system. Of course, it 
would be open to individual households to reduce their own waste charges in this way 
whether or not other households did so as well. Given that, unlike energy and water 
use for example, there is no obvious ‘basic needs’ level of waste generation, there 
would seem to be fewer arguments (assuming that convenient and effective recycling 
facilities have been introduced) why households could not radically reduce their 
waste in order to reduce their exposure to variable waste charges. It is also not clear 4 
how, in the absence of such charges, it will be possible even to curb the growth of 
household waste in the UK, let alone reduce such waste from its present level. On the 
other hand, if household waste could be reduced, then the resulting lower waste 
disposal charges could offset partially or completely the extra benefits needed to 
protect low-income households from the initially higher variable waste charges that 




This paper examines the possibilities for and implications of variable charging for 
household waste in the context of the UK’s poor record of recycling and waste 
reduction or minimisation. Waste minimisation is defined by the European 
Environment Agency’s online glossary of environmental terms (glossary.eea.eu.int) as 
‘measures and/or techniques that reduce the amount of wastes generated during any 
domestic, commercial and industrial process’. The paper deals only with the 
household sector. Following some more general discussion of the issues, the paper 
goes on to describe a household waste charging scheme that should not increase costs 
for poorer households. 
 
Section 2 of the paper outlines the present situation in regard to waste policy in 
England, particularly in the context of European legislation, the disappointing recent 
history of UK government policy in the area and the proposals contained in the 
Strategy Unit’s 2002 report Waste Not, Want Not. 
 
The third section discusses various issues related to charging for waste, including 
variable waste charging, as well as some issues related to recycling. Section 4 looks in 
more detail at a number of practical implications of variable waste charging, not least 
of which are the costs involved. It is an unfortunate fact that bare compliance with the 
requirements of the Landfill Directive is likely to significantly increase the costs of 
disposal by 2016. However, as the Strategy Unit has shown, the direct economic costs 
of continuing with present unsustainable patterns of waste production and disposal 
would not be a great deal less. Waste reduction is generally environmentally 
preferable to recycling because it avoids the use of resources in the first place, rather 
than recycling them afterwards. It can also be cheaper in the long term, although 
bringing it about does involve costs. Variable waste charging is widely held to be the 
most viable way to bring about a waste-reducing change in consumer behaviour. 
 
Section 5 looks in more detail at the issue of regressivity in relation to waste charging. 
Using new data from South Norfolk District Council, it analyses the distributional 
implications of a simple system of variable waste charging by weight and proposes a 6 
scheme for England that would be designed to avoid leading to additional net costs for 




Household waste production in the UK is currently growing, at a rate of 3% a year, 
exceeding the rate of growth of GDP. Until recently waste policy was afforded little 
attention at either a national or local level in the UK. The UK has historically relied 
upon landfill as its primary waste disposal option. Compared to most other 
industrialised countries the UK has a poor record of developing alternatives to 
landfilling and on recycling. 
 
“Most other European countries have a number of alternatives to landfill in place, as 
well as legislation and incentives to support these alternatives. Currently, almost 80% 
of municipal waste in England is sent to landfill sites, compared with around 50% in 
France and 7% in Switzerland. England recycles just 12% of its municipal waste, 
while Germany recycles 52% and the Netherlands 47%.” (Strategy Unit, 2002, p.7) 
 
Factors underpinning the UK’s poor environmental performance on waste include the 
ready availability of cheap landfill sites, weaker regulatory controls and the absence 
of incentives for recycling, low public awareness and an inability or unwillingness on 
the part of many local authorities to invest in more expensive recycling and waste 
disposal options.  
 
However, recent developments in national policy are now beginning to feed through 
to the local level, and with further changes in the pipeline, these will increasingly 
impact upon individual households and consumers over the next two to three years. 
 
A major driver of these changes in the area of waste management is a number of 
European directives, including the 1975 Waste Framework Directive, the 1991 
Hazardous Waste Directive (not dealt with here), the 1994 Packaging Waste Directive 
(see Appendix) and the 1999 Landfill Directive. The UK has generally had a poor 
record of implementing waste directives. For example, a 2002 European Court ruling 
found that the UK had failed by 1999 to implement parts of the Waste Framework 7 
Directive and to properly transpose the Hazardous Waste Directive and the Packaging 
Waste Directive. The Waste Strategy 2000 (DETR 2000) for England and Wales was 
designed to address these directives and particularly the new Landfill Directive. The 
UK is also proceeding with preparations to implement the Waste Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive and the End of Life Vehicles (ELV) 
Directive. The EU is currently developing further directives on integrated product 
policy, eco-design and biowastes. 
 
Furthermore, waste is a significant issue with respect to the UK’s climate change 
objectives, with landfill currently accounting for some 25% of UK methane gas 
emissions. It is also becoming increasingly difficult to find new landfill sites in the 
South East in particular. 
 
2.1  Relevant European waste directives 
 
The Framework Directive on waste (Directive 75/442/EEC) 
 
Under the Waste Directive, member states are required to establish an integrated 
waste management strategy with clearly defined time scales and objectives based on 
the principles of the directive. The principles are the waste hierarchy (reduction, 
reuse, recycling, energy recovery, incineration without energy recovery, landfilling), 
best available technology, the proximity principle, national self-sufficiency in waste 
disposal, the polluter pays principle and a duty of care for producers of waste. The 
Directive also establishes provision for inspection and monitoring of waste 
management, and lays down reporting requirements.  
 
The Landfill Directive (Directive 99/31/EC) 
 
The Landfill Directive requires the UK (along with Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain) to reduce the tonnage of biodegradable waste going to landfill to 75% of its 
1995 level by 2010, 50% by 2013 and 35% by 2020. The other member states, which 
sent less than 80% of waste to landfill in 1995, have to meet these targets four years 
earlier. The UK is not currently on track to meet the targets set in the Directive. 8 
Although the proportion of municipal waste disposed in landfill declined from 84 per 
cent in 1996/97 to 78 per cent in 2000/01, the amount actually increased from 20.6 
million tonnes to 22.1 million tonnes (DEFRA, 2001). 
 
The Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive 
(Directive 2002/96/EC) 
 
The WEEE directive must be implemented by the end of 2004. From July 2005 all 
electrical and electronic equipment put onto the market must be marked. The marking 
will help to differentiate between new and historic WEEE. By the end of 2006 the UK 
must have a rate of separate collection of at least 4kg on average per inhabitant per 
year of WEEE from private households by this date. According to DEFRA, the UK is 
already meeting this target. The targets will be reviewed at the end of 2008. It is 
important to note that consumers have no direct obligations under the Directive. 
However, the producers of electrical and electronic equipment are obliged to 
encourage separate disposal of WEEE.
i 
 
2.2 UK  waste  policy 
 
The 1995 White Paper Making Waste Work 
 
The first detailed framework for waste management in the UK was the 1995 White 
Paper  Making Waste Work (Department of the Environment, 1995). It set the 
following aspirational targets: 
 
•  To reduce the proportion of controlled waste going to landfill from 
70% to 60% by 2005; 
 
•  To recover value from 40% of municipal waste by 2005; 
 
•  To recycle or compost 25% of household waste by 2000. 
 9 
The proportion of municipal waste recovered (recycled, composted or incinerated 
with energy recovery) rose from 13.6% in 1996/97 to 21.3% in 2000/01. The 
proportion of household waste recycled or composted rose from 7.5% in 1996/97 to 
11.2% in 2000/01.
ii It can be seen that the third target was missed by a very large 
margin. 
 
The Waste Strategy 2000 for England and Wales 
 
This Strategy (DETR, 2000) replaced Making Waste Work as government policy in 
the area. It set new targets: 
 
•  To reduce the amount of industrial and commercial waste landfilled to 
85% of 1998 levels by 2005; 
 
•  To recover value from 40% of municipal waste by 2005, 45% by 2010 
and 67% by 2015; 
 
•  To recycle or compost at least 25% of household waste by 2005, at 
least 30% by 2010 and at least 33% by 2015; 
 
•  In accordance with the Landfill Directive, to reduce the amount of 
biodegradable waste going to landfill to 75% of 1995 levels by 2010, 50% by 
2013 and 35% by 2020. 
 
A number of levers were set out in the Waste Strategy. The Waste and Resources 
Action Programme (WRAP) was set up to overcome market barriers to promoting re-
use and recycling. It focuses on developing markets and end-uses for re-used and 
recycled materials. The government set up a pilot scheme for public procurement of 
recycled goods, initially recycled paper. A voluntary agreement with newspaper 
publishers to increase the recycled content of newsprint was announced. A similar 
voluntary agreement with the direct ‘junk’ mail industry has been reached (Strategy 
Unit 2002, p.64) . 
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The Waste Strategy proposed a system of tradable permits for the landfill of 
biodegradable municipal waste to be allocated free to local authorities. The aim is to 
enable local authorities to meet their targets under the Landfill Directive with greater 
flexibility and at lower cost. This proposal was contained in the Waste and Emissions 
Trading Bill, which was passed by Parliament in 2003. The Secretary of State for the 
Environment, and the devolved governments, now have powers to allocate to waste 
disposal authorities in their areas the maximum amount of allowances for the landfill 
of biodegradable municipal waste in Directive target years (see 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/waste/wetbill/index.htm for details).   
 
The 1999 Budget Statement announced that the standard rate of landfill tax would 
increase from £10 per tonne by £1 per tonne per year until 2004. 
 
The targets in the Waste Strategy for recycling or composting of household waste are 
to be achieved by statutory performance standards for local authorities responsible for 
waste disposal. The following standards were set to be achieved by 2003/4:  
 
•  Local authorities that were recycling under 5% in 1998-99 must 
recycle over 10%.  
 
•  Local authorities recycling between 5-15% in 1998-99 must double their 
rate.  
 
•  Local authorities recycling over 15% in 1998-99 must recycle a third of 
household waste. 
 
If those standards are met, they would mean a national recycling and composting rate 
of 17%. 
 
Further standards for 2005/6 were set in 2001: 
 
•  Local authorities with 1998/99 household waste recycling and 
composting rates of under 6% to achieve at least 18%  11 
•  Local authorities with 1998/99 household waste recycling and 
composting rates of between 6% and 12% to at least treble their recycling and 
composting rate  
 
•  Local authorities with 1998/99 household waste recycling and 
composting rates of between 12% and 18% to reach at least 36% 
 
•  The remaining authorities to recycle or compost at least 40% of 
household waste. 
 
If those standards are met, they would mean a national recycling and composting rate 
of 25%. 
 
The Waste Strategy was strongly criticised in a parliamentary committee report 
(House of Commons Environment Transport and Regional Affairs Committee, 2001). 
The report rehearsed a number of specific criticisms of the Waste Strategy: that it 
failed to adequately reflect the need to reduce waste production, that it was over-
focused on achieving the targets in the Landfill Directive, that it was ambiguous on 
the issue of incineration and that it was dominated by municipal waste, to the 
exclusion of the larger streams of commercial and industrial waste and the 
problematic ‘hazardous waste’. Their most serious criticism was that ‘the document 
fails to provide a real vision or strategy’, but instead a list of aspirations and some 
relatively weak levers to achieve those aims. The report also pointed to the 
inadequacy of data on waste, which is incomplete, unreliable and often published too 
late to be of use. 
 
The 2002 Strategy Unit Report  
 
A new waste strategy for England (Waste not, Want not - A strategy for tackling the 
waste problem in England) was proposed by the Strategy Unit at the end of 2002 
(Strategy Unit, 2002). It was more ambitious than the Waste Strategy 2000, although 
it is important to note that it is only a proposal. However, the recent Energy White 
Paper was rather similar to the earlier Strategy Unit report on that subject, so it is 12 
likely that any future White Paper will contain many of the Strategy Unit’s proposals, 
although no White Paper is planned at present. 
 
The Strategy Unit proposed the following targets: 
 
•  Reducing the rate of household waste growth from 3% to 2% per 
annum by the end of 2006; 
•  50% of households carrying out home composting by 2006; 
•  The nationwide roll out of kerbside recycling collections; 
•  A target of at least 35% of household waste being composted or 
recycled by 2010 and at least 45% by 2015; 
•  An absolute reduction in the amount of municipal waste going to 
landfill by 2007; 
•  30% of local authorities to have tried incentive-based schemes for 
household waste by 2005/6. 
 
The Strategy Unit recognised the need for a comprehensive framework of economic 
and regulatory measures to ensure that these objectives were met. The Strategy Unit 
pointed out that householders currently pay the same Council Tax no matter how 
much waste they produce or whether they recycle or not. Some local authorities in 
many other industrialised countries have variable charging for household waste. They 
suggested Council Tax discounts or reward schemes for people who compost or 
recycle regularly, or variable charging where households pay according to the amount 
of unrecycled and unsorted waste they produce. Before the publication of the report, it 
was reported that the Strategy Unit would propose that households should be allowed 
two bags of waste collected each week, but that they would have to pay £1 for each 
additional bag. That potentially controversial measure did not find its way into the 
final report. Instead, they discussed the idea that the costs of waste management could 
be taken out of Council Tax and paid for separately through variable charging 
schemes. Significantly, the Strategy Unit report called for early legislative changes to 
allow local authorities to implement incentive and charging schemes for municipal 
waste collection. 
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The report’s recommendations also included:  
 
•  A significant increase in the landfill tax over the medium term. It noted 
that a rise to £35 a tonne is required to change behaviour, signalled several 
years in advance to allow the development of alternatives.
iii 
•  An extension of voluntary agreements with industry to reduce waste 
and increase the use of recycled materials and the recyclability of products. 
•  Further consideration of incentives to increase the re-use and recycling 
of goods such as: 
o  deposit schemes for hazardous items such as glass bottles, 
batteries, light bulbs, etc 
o  product taxes on single use items such as batteries, plastic bags, 
etc 
o  reduced rates of VAT for recycled goods 
o  removal of barriers to the use of recycled goods, such as 
inappropriate British Standards 
•  Revision of the building regulations to require housing developments 
with more than 50 houses to allocate space for easily accessible recycling 
facilities. 
•  (Voluntary) green procurement and waste reduction targets for the 
public sector, and new Best Value indicators for local authorities. 
•  The development of (European) quality standards for compost. 
 
In addition the report called for the case for a ban on the landfilling or incineration of 
of recyclable products to be reviewed in 2006, tougher sentences for waste crimes, for 
the case for an incineration tax
iv to be kept under review, and for an independent body 
to be established to review the evidence on the health and environmental effects of 
different waste disposal options. 
 
The report identified four key areas for investment. First, tackling the growth in 
waste. It proposed increasing WRAP’s role in waste reduction programmes, 
expanding home composting and increasing funding to Envirowise to help industry 
reduce waste. Second, developing the infrastructure for recycling and associated 14 
education. It proposed that kerbside recycling programmes, focusing on organic 
waste, should be rolled out. Third, improving data and research on waste 
management. Fourth, funding for pilots of alternative technologies for waste 
treatment. 
 
The Strategy Unit estimated that the cost of implementing the strategy set out in its 
report would be only about 10% greater for local authorities than the costs of 
continuing present waste disposal practices and trends over the 18 years to 2020 
(£29.6 billion versus £26.7 billion). Its strategy involved reducing the rate of growth 
in waste, 45% recycling, 10% incineration, 20% mechanical biological treatment 
(MBT) and other recovery technologies, and 25% landfill. The present mix is about 
80% landfill, 10% incineration and 10% recycling. A ‘maximum recycling’ strategy 
of 60% recycling, 30% landfill and 10% incineration (but, unfairly for comparison, 
without reduction in waste growth) would be about 5% more expensive still (£31.0 
billion), but was judged to require a huge change in culture and behaviour, be less 
feasible in policy terms than pursuing a range of options and would still leave a 
significant residue for landfill. 
 
In December 2002 DEFRA announced the allocation of £76 million from the National 
Waste Minimisation and Recycling Fund to help local authorities set up recycling and 
waste initiatives across England. This announcement related to initiatives for 2003/04 
and followed a previous allocation of £40 million from the fund to help projects 
during 2002/03. This earlier announcement also ring-fenced £21 million for projects 
in London over the two-year period (DEFRA, 2002). 
 
Local authorities and recycling 
 
In the Foreword to the Strategy Unit’s report, the Prime Minister writes: ‘It is 
excellent that some local authorities are really starting to deliver on recycling. But 
the majority are not, and many are not even trying seriously. We need now a step 
change.’ (p. 3) 
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Parfitt (2002) points out that the authorities that report the highest rates of recycling 
(up to 35%) have targeted collection of garden waste for centralised composting 
although much of it would probably have been composted at home or left in situ. The 
composting of garden waste is an easy way for authorities to obtain apparently high 
recycling rates. Weight-based recycling targets that do not differentiate by material 
are encouraging more waste to enter the waste stream. Among authorities that have 
not targeted garden waste, the maximum recycling rate is less than 20%. Parfitt also 
points out that the authorities with the highest recycling rates are among the least 
socially deprived, while the authorities with the lowest rates are among the most 
socially deprived. It is known that the affluent tend to be more enthusiastic about 
recycling, while members of socially excluded groups are more likely to belong to the 
10-15% of the population who say they would not recycle in any circumstances 
(MORI, 2002). 
 
However, higher recycling rates are found in many other European countries than 
even the best found in Britain. The more general problem of relatively low 
participation in kerbside recycling is due primarily to problems of information, 
awareness, motivation and culture. For instance, MORI research for the Strategy Unit 
report found that half of people who lived in areas with kerbside recycling had said 
that they did not have kerbside recycling and the vast majority had said that they 
would recycle more if they did have kerbside recycling (MORI, 2002). 
 
Access to appropriate composting and recycling facilities are key issues for 
consumers. In particular it has been shown that access to kerbside recycling facilities 
is a major determinant of household recycling behaviour (Resource Recovery Forum, 
2002). 
There are some additional minor issues of access for people who live in blocks of flats 
and for those who live in small or crowded homes. It is difficult to carry several boxes 
of sorted waste for recycling down to the bottom of the block. It is also difficult to 
find space for several boxes in a small kitchen. Many schemes instead provide a 
single box for all dry recyclables and perhaps a closed box for organic waste. A single 
box for dry recyclables means that more sorting has to be done centrally, but it makes 
it easier for people to participate, particularly if they live in a flat or cramped 
premises. 16 
The choices that individual consumers can make about the disposal of waste are 
usually highly constrained by the nature of the waste management and recycling 
infrastructure in the places where they live. If there is no convenient means of 
recycling, then people who wish to do so find their choices effectively constrained. If 
recycling is available, people are currently free not to participate. 
 
Some members of socially disadvantaged groups are those most strongly objecting to 
recycling personally, arguing that their lives are difficult already (MORI, 2002). 
There is a question about whether the most socially disadvantaged groups might lack 
access to sufficient choices to enable them to recycle as much of their waste as more 
affluent groups. The evidence is that poorer households consume more canned food, 
while richer households consume more fresh food and food packaged in plastic 
(University of East Anglia et al, 2000). Given that metal cans can easily be recycled, 
while plastic is currently difficult and expensive to recycle, the limited data available 
would suggest that is not likely to be the case. 
 
3. Charging for waste  
 
3.1  The Strategy Unit recommendation 
 
England spends about 60% of the EU average on waste management and disposal and 
around 40% of those at the leading edge of waste management. Waste management 
accounts for around 0.5% of GDP in the UK versus 1.0% in the Netherlands (Strategy 
Unit 2002). Because of England’s reliance on landfill, householders pay some of the 
lowest rates for waste collection and disposal in Europe – around £50 per year on 
average (Enviros Aspinwall, 2000), which is roughly half the EU average and about 
30% of the rate of high performing countries. England’s lower spend on waste per 
capita reflects both the relative cheapness and the efficiency of landfill. However, 
while some landfill will justifiably continue to provide a disposal route for certain 
wastes (Eunomia Research and Consulting, 2001), England’s current over-reliance on 
this form of waste disposal means that significant environmental impacts are not 
being captured in what households pay. 
 17 
The Strategy Unit report states: 
 
“householders need to reduce the waste they produce, for example through home 
composting and purchasing goods with less packaging; reusing products; using 
recycling facilities; and contributing to collections for composting facilities where 
home composting is not practical” (Strategy Unit 2002, p.13). 
 
Waste reduction (producing less waste start with) is generally environmentally 
preferable to recycling. Unfortunately, MORI (2002) found that members of the 
public are not aware of that and perceive the environmental impact of a product being 
negated if it is recycled. The most effective way of getting consumers to reduce the 
amount of waste they produce is through variable waste charging for unsorted waste. 
Under these schemes, people are charged according to the quantity of residual (non-
recycled) waste they consume. Variable charging could be considered to reduce 
personal choice because people have to pay more if they do not recycle. On the other 
hand, landfilling and incineration of waste and the consequent waste of recyclable 
resources have greater environmental impacts on society as a whole. It is a matter of 
trading off different kinds of constraints. 
 
It was reported that the Strategy Unit was considering a proposal that each household 
should be allowed two bags of rubbish per week, but would have to pay £1 for each 
additional bag. The idea was criticised in the press as meaning that people would have 
to pay twice for their rubbish. The final report’s discussion of variable charging 
stated: “A key element of these direct or variable charging schemes is that the waste 
management element of Council Tax is replaced by a charge related to the amount of 
weight of unsorted waste in order to finance recycling services. It does not involve 
people being charged twice to have their waste collected and disposed of. On the 
contrary, it creates incentives to compost or recycle in order to lower the charge. The 
scheme is therefore an incentive-based one where people who compost and recycle 
pay less.” (Strategy Unit 2002, p. 60, original emphasis) 
 
In the event the Strategy Unit report only recommended that the law in the UK should 
be changed so that Local Authorities should become free to introduce “incentive 
schemes to encourage waste reduction and recycling if they wish to do so” (Strategy 18 
Unit 2002, p. 130), a freedom to introduce variable waste charging that exists in many 
other industrialised countries.  
 
3.2  Variable waste charging systems 
 
Variable charging for waste not only encourages people to recycle, but also makes 
them more conscious about avoiding producing waste in the first place. Variable 
charging schemes in North America have reduced the amount of residual waste 
disposed of by 15-45% without any apparent problems of additional unauthorised 
dumping (Enviros Aspinwall, 2000). Similar results have been found in Europe 
(Eunomia Research and Consulting, 2001). 
 
There are essentially four different systems of variable rate charging for household 
waste: 
 
1.  Bag or tag/sticker schemes: the waste collector only picks up waste that has 
been placed in specially identified bags or containers. Householders may purchase 
either special bags or tags/stickers which must be fixed to the standard bags or 
containers used. 
2.  Volume-based schemes: householders choose a waste container or bin of a 
certain volume and an annual charge is based on container volume and often the 
collection frequency as well. 
3. Frequency-based schemes: householders choose the frequency of their 
collection (usually either weekly or fortnightly) and pay accordingly. 
Alternatively, they pay only when they put out waste for collection. 
4.  Weight-based schemes: collection vehicles are fitted with automatic weight-
recording devices which record the mass of the waste collected. Each household’s 
bin is fitted with an electronic identification transponder to identify it. 
 
Many authorities have introduced hybrid systems with a fixed fee for a basic level of 
service and a variable fee for more frequent collection or the collection of additional 
containers above the specified minimum limit. The strengths and weaknesses of the 
different schemes are discussed in Table 3.1, and further below. 19 
 




Bag or tag/sticker schemes 
Easy to implement and operate and 
provides a direct incentive for waste 
reduction. 
Allows residents full flexibility. 
Simple billing system. 
No special arrangements necessary for 
multi-occupancy buildings. 
Sealed bags/sacks prevent use by other 
people. 
 
Bags/sacks require manual collection and 
not compatible with automatic collection 
systems. 
Refuse easily scattered from damaged 
bags. 
Possible loss or theft of tags/stickers. 
Unstable revenue stream. 
May encourage residents to store waste 
for excessive time. 
Use of bags may be seen as a retrograde 
step. 
Volume-based schemes 
Relatively easy to install in areas that 
already use wheeled bins and automatic 
uplift systems. 
May be considered an intermediate step 
which allows residents to engage in waste 
reduction. 
Fairly stable revenue stream. 
 
Resident problems in selecting a suitable 
bin size. 
System limited by range of bin sizes 
offered. 
Fixed annual charge removes incentive to 
reduce waste below chosen capacity. 
High up-front capital costs. 
Difficult in multi-occupancy dwellings. 
Complex billing process – requires 
tracking of bin sizes by address and 
checking during collection. 




Frequency-based schemes (fixed 
frequency) 
Easy to implement and operate, requiring 
only changes to the billing system. 
Low capital cost because uses existing 
bins. 
May result in significant reductions in 
collection time (and costs). 
Fairly stable revenue stream. 
 
Public health and amenity concerns from 
waste storing. 
Fixed annual charge removes incentive to 
reduce waste collection below chosen 
frequency. 
Staff must ensure that chosen frequency 
has been paid for. 
Waste cramming by residents. 
Frequency-based scheme (at call) 
Allows residents full flexibility. 
Provides direct incentives. 
Automated billing system. 
Uses existing bins. 
 
 
Public health and amenity concerns from 
waste storing. 
Cost of transponders and associated 
equipment to record uplifts. 
Difficulties associated with installing 
transponders to existing bins and 
matching addresses 
Relatively unstable revenue stream. 
Weight-based schemes 
Allows residents full flexibility. 
Provides direct incentives. 
Flexible automated billing. 
Provides good data for decision making 
in waste management 
 
Expensive to set up – requires 
sophisticated weighing equipment. 
Possible inaccuracies in data logging. 
May be significant increases in collection 
times because of care required in 
weighing process. 
May encounter higher levels of 
opposition. 
More susceptible to waste illegally placed 
in other people’s bins – particularly in 
multi-occupancy dwellings. 
(Adapted from table in Enviros Aspinwall 2000, pp. 11-12) 
 21 
Volume-based and fixed frequency-based schemes have the obvious problems that 
they are inflexible, do not provide incentives at the margin and many people are 
tempted to err on the side of paying for more service than they need. They are also 
difficult to operate in multi-occupancy buildings. However, they are popular in North 
America. 
 
At-call frequency-based schemes do not have these disadvantages, but they lead to 
waste hoarding, which is a public health and amenity issue. People in smaller homes 
do not have the ability to store waste for long periods that those in larger homes have, 
so there is also an issue of social justice. 
 
The most common types of schemes use tags or stickers. They are relatively cheap 
and administratively simple to operate. People must pay for the tags or stickers that 
are distributed, with additional tags or stickers available from shops at a higher rate. 
Theft of other people’s stickers or tags can be a problem, particularly in multi-
occupancy buildings. Some schemes use special bags, but that is more complicated 
and expensive to operate, so less common, even though it is less susceptible to theft. 
Bag or tag/sticker schemes are considered better in terms of incentives for waste 
reduction than volume or frequency schemes, but not as good as weight-based 
schemes. 
 
Weight-based schemes have been introduced in a number of municipalities in Europe 
and were piloted in a few towns in North America in the mid-1990s. The North 
American schemes experienced a number of problems with the technology. They 
found that there were substantial opportunities for error in the system and that because 
disputes over the weight billed occurred significantly after the fact they were virtually 
impossible to determine (Enviros Aspinwall, 2000). However, schemes in European 
countries have been successful (Eunomia Research and Consulting, 2001). These 
schemes have usually been operated in municipalities with few multi-occupancy 
buildings. Because of the problem of people putting their rubbish in other people’s 
bins, it is necessary for bins in multi-occupancy buildings to be lockable. Such 
schemes have been successfully tested or implemented in a number of municipalities 
in Germany (Eunomia Research and Consulting, 2001). 
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Because of concerns about social exclusion, some American schemes (although not 
European ones) provide free tags or reduced rates for welfare recipients. However, 
very few schemes do provide such discounts, possibly due to the additional 
complexity and because in most cases the annual cost of waste services is not high 
compared to other utility bills, typically less than £100-150 per annum (Enviros 
Aspinwall, 2000). Clearly a key question for the UK is how could the additional costs 
of a more sustainable waste management system, including variable waste charging, 
could be borne without disproportionately increasing the costs for the poorest 
households. It was to this question that the research in this project was largely 
directed, as described in the rest of this paper. 
 
4. Implications of variable waste charging for the UK 
 
4.1  Costs and benefits of variable waste charging options 
 
Eunomia has estimated the costs and benefits of four different options for variable 
waste charging based on the experience in the US and Europe (Eunomia Research and 
Consulting, 2003). The options were a weight-based system, a sack-based system and 
two forms of bin identification system (one more capital-intensive, the other more 
labour-intensive). The bin identification systems have a chip that allows householders 
to be charged when they put out a bin, but do not involve weighing them. 
 
Eunomia’s estimates consider the incremental costs of implementation. In other 
words, they allow for the additional costs of buying new vehicles that can implement 
a particular system, but do not allow for the costs of replacing existing useful vehicles 
simply to introduce a new system of charging. The only one of the options considered 
that could be implemented without new equipment is a sack-based charging system. It 
could be implemented even in areas that currently have bins if the sacks were to be 
placed in the existing bins. Eunomia’s estimates are based on the assumption of a 
source separation rate before variable charging of 32 percent, which is found in some 
UK local authorities with centralised composting, but is much higher than the national 
average. Eunomia assumes an existing cost of £66.04 per household, but in many 23 
local authorities that do little recycling at present the cost is only about £50, although 
government targets mean that will have to rise quickly anyway. 
 
When all four systems were assumed to have the same effect, they calculated based on 
the US experience that there would be a six per cent source reduction and a 16 percent 
improvement in separate collection of recyclables. Eunomia calculated that at present 
disposal costs for the UK, the net cost per household increases from £66.04 to £70.11 
for a sack-based system or £72.72 for a weight-based system, with the bin 
identification systems in between at £72.24 and £71.58. Under these assumptions, the 
very low technical and administrative costs of the sack-based system narrowly win 
out. It is worth noting in this regard that in practice it would be difficult for the half of 
local authorities that now have bin-based systems to go back to sacks because refuse 
collection staff prefer to work with bins for health and safety reasons. 
 
However, although weight-based charging is the most expensive to introduce, 
experience in Europe shows that it leads to greater source reduction and greater 
accuracy of separation than the other options. Under this assumption, a weight-based 
system led to a 25 percent source reduction, and a 33 percent increase in the separate 
collection of recyclables; the bin-based systems to a 13 percent source reduction and a 
27 percent increase in the separate collection of recyclables; while the sack-based 
system led to a six per cent source reduction and a 16 percent improvement in 
separate collection of recyclables. With these assumptions, the cost of the sack-based 
system remained at £70.11, the bin-based systems dropped to £69.12 and £68.55, and 
the weight-based system fell to £61.72. That made the weight-based system £4.23 
cheaper than the existing system. 
 
Even if a weight-based system does not bring such a substantial source reduction as 
assumed in these calculations, it can be seen that it only needs to deliver slightly more 
source reduction than the other systems to be cheaper on balance, despite the higher 
capital costs to set it up. However, this cannot be guaranteed, and there are many 
factors to be taken into account in considering which scheme should be introduced in 
different circumstances. 
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On the other hand, these calculations are based on a typical cost of £30 per tonne for 
residual waste disposal. If residual waste disposal costs increase (with, for example, 
an increased landfill tax) then the economics of variable waste charging, and 
particularly of weight-based systems that bring about the greatest source reduction, 
look even better. 
 
There is controversy over whether the source reduction found with variable waste 
charging is real, or whether the waste is instead somehow displaced. Opponents of 
variable waste charging frequently assert that the waste cannot just disappear, it must 
go somewhere – and that somewhere must be undesirable, in the form of fly-tipping 
or car trips to friends in other areas that do not have variable waste charging. Eunomia 
found that in a case study in Landkreis Schweinfurt (Germany), where the recycling 
rate increased from 64 percent to 76 percent and residual waste production fell by 43 
percent, it could be shown that the reduction was accounted for principally by 
diversion of waste from the biowaste bin (which was charged for) to households’ 
gardens. 
 
4.2  Waste charges and Council Tax 
 
Waste charges are currently included in Council Tax. Because this tax has a smaller 
range (between high and low Council Tax bands) than income (see Table 4.1), 
Council Tax is a regressive tax. The existing ratios for charging do not reflect the 
ratios in the value of the homes concerned, but are roughly the square root of those 
ratios, except for Band A households who pay rather more. The ratio is also less than 











Table 4.1  Council Tax bands and ratios 
 
Valuation Band   Value at 1st of April 1991   Ratio to Band D  
A   Up to £40,000   6/9ths  
B  Over £40,000 and up to £52,000   7/9ths  
C   Over £52,000 and up to £68,000   8/9ths  
D   Over £68,000 and up to £88,000   1  
E   Over £88,000 and up to £120,000   11/9ths  
F   Over £120,000 and up to £160,000   13/9ths  
G   Over £160,000 and up to £320,000   15/9ths 
H   Over £320,000   18/9ths  
 
However, because about 75 percent of local authorities’ funding comes from central 
government block grants, rather than Council Tax, the amount of money that is 
actually paid out of Council Tax for waste services is only about 25 percent of the 
total cost (excluding any special payments made by central government to support 
recycling schemes). Reducing households’ Council Tax bills by the entire amount 
would also involve reducing the central government block grant. Transferring the 
entire cost to direct charges would be necessary in order for the marginal cost of an 
additional unit of waste to be high enough to have any incentive effect for most 
households. What can be said is that if the waste component of Council Tax were 
stripped out of Council Tax by a fixed amount across households (the amount might 
differ across local authorities), this would be progressive in respect of the Council Tax 
payments (i.e. those of lower income households would tend to fall proportionately 
more than those of richer households), although it would be regressive in terms of 
waste charges if these were levied on a per-household basis. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows that Council Tax bands are distributed very differently by region. It 
should be noted that in regions where Band A is predominant, such as the North East 
(60% of homes) and Yorkshire (46%), Council Tax band is a less good indicator of 
income than in regions such as London and the South East where there are few homes 
in the bottom bands and a large number in the higher bands. Regression analysis 26 
shows that the overall correlation between income and Council Tax band is 0.396, so 
39.6% of the variance in income is reflected in Council Tax band. The correlation is 
strong, but not overwhelming. 
 
































The distribution of Council Tax bands according to income decile among English 
















Band B  Band C Band 
D 






34.4% 22.5% 21.1% 10.6% 6.4%  2.8%  2.3%  0% 
Decile 
2 
34.1% 23.5% 15.5% 15.9% 6.6%  2.7%  1.8%  0% 
Decile 
3 
28.6% 16.4% 24.8% 12.2% 10.1% 4.6%  2.1%  0.8% 
Decile 
4 
25.9% 24.4% 23.7% 13.5% 6.0%  2.3%  3.4%  0.4% 
Decile 
5 
29.3% 21.4% 19.9% 16.5% 5.3%  4.9%  1.5%  0.8% 
Decile 
6 
24.5% 26.0% 19.7% 14.4% 8.5%  3.8%  3.1%  0% 
Decile 
7 
21.4% 24.6% 17.8% 19.6% 8.3%  5.3%  2.1%  0.9% 
Decile 
8 
20.5% 21.4% 23.3% 17.1% 6.8%  5.3%  3.7%  0.6% 
Decile 
9 
18.4% 20.2% 17.2% 20.6% 11.7% 5.2%  5.2%  1.2% 
Decile 
10 
11.5% 14.1% 21.1% 23.7% 15.9% 8.9%  4.2%  0.5% 
 
The percentages recorded for the higher bands are clearly not very reliable because 
they are subject to random sampling error. It can be seen that quite a large proportion 
of wealthy households live in homes with low Council Tax bands (47% of Decile 10 
live in houses in Bands A-C), while very few poor households live in homes with high 
Council Tax bands (only 5% of Decile 1 live in houses in Bands F-H). 
 
Table 4.3 below shows the distribution of income deciles according to Council Tax 
band among English households in the Family Expenditure Survey 2001. 
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The figures given for the higher Council Tax bands in Table 4.3 should be taken with 
extreme caution as there were too few households in those bands to give statistically 
reliable results. However, it can be seen that the correlation between income and 
Council Tax band is not as high as might be expected. It can be seen that rich 
households are only somewhat under-represented among households in the lowest 
bands, while poor households are very under-represented among households in the 
highest bands. 
 
























10.9%  11.2%  9.9% 10.0% 11.4% 11.4% 10.5% 9.6% 8.7% 6.4% 
Band 
B 
7.9% 8.6% 6.3% 10.5% 9.2% 13.4% 13.4% 11.2%  10.7% 8.7% 
Band 
C 
7.8% 5.9% 10.0%  10.7% 9.0% 10.7% 10.2% 12.7%  9.5% 13.7%
Band 
D 
4.7% 7.3% 5.9% 7.3% 8.9% 9.3% 13.4% 11.2%  13.6% 18.5%
Band 
E 
5.4% 5.8% 9.3% 6.2% 5.4% 10.4% 10.8% 8.5% 14.7% 23.6%
Band 
F 
4.3% 4.3% 7.9% 4.3% 9.3% 8.6% 12.9% 12.1%  12.1% 24.3%
Band 
G 
5.6% 4.5% 5.6% 10.1% 4.5% 11.2% 7.9% 13.5%  19.1% 18.0%
Band 
H 
0% 0% 12.5%  6.3%  12.5% 0% 18.8% 12.5%  25.0% 12.5%
 
Two-thirds (66.5%) of households in England as a whole are in the bottom three 
bands, but the pattern varies widely between areas, as shown in Table 4.4, which 
gives the percentage of households in each Council Tax band in England as a whole, 
in the district with the lowest average Council Tax band (Easington) and the district 
with the highest average Council Tax band (Kensington and Chelsea). 29 


















England  25.8% 19.2% 21.5% 15.0% 9.4%  5.0%  3.6%  0.6% 




0.7%  3.9%  10.5% 15.6% 15.5% 13.9% 23.5% 16.5% 
 
It can be seen that even if there was a rebalancing of the ratios charged for Council 
Tax to cover the shift to variable waste charging, there is little possibility for a district 
such as Easington to protect even Band A households from increases because there 
are so few households in higher bands to cover the additional costs. By contrast, it 
would be easy for a district such as Kensington and Chelsea to do so because there are 
a great many households in the higher bands. Taking the regions as a whole, Band A 
is dominant in the North and Bands A and B combined are dominant in the Midlands. 
Only in the South are there a large number of households in the higher Council Tax 
bands. So in most parts of the North, at least, Council Tax bands do not offer a 
mechanism to prevent an increase in the cost to poor households due to more separate 
waste collections for recycling. It would be necessary either to increase benefits or for 
central government to provide funding for the entire additional cost for recycling 
(about £1.6 billion per annum, according to the Strategy Unit report) out of 
progressive general taxation. 
 
4.3  Other incentive schemes 
 
Recent research (Parfitt, 2002) suggests that socio-economic variables (including or 
closely correlated with income) do not significantly influence household waste 
arisings. The same research confirms that these arisings nevertheless vary greatly 
according to local authority, from about 15 to over 30 kg/household on average per 
week. The lowest amounts are found in local authorities that have refuse systems 
based on sacks or 140 litre bins, and which encourage home composting (the easiest 
way to take a large mass of waste out of the official waste stream). The largest 30 
amounts are found in local authorities that provide 240 litre bins and do not encourage 
home composting. The analysis showed that once the amount of waste taken to civic 
amenity sites was included, the difference was much less stark. Since car journeys to 
civic amenity sites impose an environmental impact of their own, they are less 
desirable than local authority collection. Poorer households are less likely to have a 
car and more reliant on local authority collections. 
 
It is not clear whether the Strategy Unit’s recommendation about variable waste 
charging would lead to charges above current waste charges for those households who 
do not reduce and recycle, or charge reductions for those that do. Given that recycling 
is more expensive than disposal, the latter would require substantial resources from 
elsewhere (needing to fund the required schemes from reduced waste charge 
revenues). It may be noted that public perceptions, that recycling saves local 
authorities money rather than increases costs, are at variance with reality and might be 
a barrier to increasing waste charges to fund recycling schemes (Resource Recovery 
Forum, 2002). It is generally perceived that it is necessary to have effective recycling 
facilities in place before variable charging is introduced (Resource Recovery Forum, 
2002), or at least for them to be introduced in tandem with it (Enviros Aspinwall, 
2000). There is thus a serious funding issue to be addressed before variable waste 
charging can be seriously considered, whether it is intended that the variable charges 
should eventually help to pay for the costs of recycling or not. Generating the tax 
revenues to pay for recycling may itself raise equity and distributional concerns, but 
these are not further explored here. 
 
The simplest way of creating an incentive for recycling is to provide a flat-rate 
payment for households that do or a penalty for households that do not. In Switzerland 
and the American states of Connecticut and New Jersey, it is mandatory for 
households to sort waste for recycling. In theory, penalties are enforced against 
householders who persistently fail to do so, although in the American experience 
enforcement against households has been patchy. Such a measure could be unpopular, 
but sends a strong message that not recycling is socially unacceptable behaviour. The 
penalties can be used to fund enforcement. However, although recycling rates in 
Switzerland are among the highest in the world, recycling rates among households in 
New Jersey and Connecticut are not particularly high compared to those found in 31 
some European countries. In much of Switzerland, householders must pay for each 
bag of residual waste that they produce. The highest recycling rates are in Flanders 
and the Netherlands, where sorting waste for recycling is not mandatory. About 85% 
of the UK population says that it is willing to recycle, although the proportion that 
actually participates is much lower. Mandatory recycling is a method of reaching the 
minority of the population that is not willing and the substantial proportion that is 
willing but not motivated enough to actually do it. However, such an approach has to 
be enforced in order to be effective. 
 
The alternative to a stick is a carrot. There have been two recent experiments in 
London providing small cash incentives to households that do recycle, with some 
success in increasing recycling rates - by 27% and 34% respectively (Strategy Unit, 
2002). Participation in the bring scheme on a high-density estate in Tulse Hill was still 
only 13% and 11% qualified for the £10 incentive by participating more than half the 
time. Payment increased participation in kerbside recycling from 34% to 41%, while 
22% of households qualified for the £10 incentive by participating more than half the 
time. However, the money for such a scheme has to come from somewhere – on a 
larger scale, local or national expenditure would have to increase even further than 
they would in order simply to cover the additional costs of a more sustainable waste 
management system. There is also the question of whether it is appropriate to pay 
people to do something that some would consider a matter of social responsibility. 
The danger is that it might create an unenthusiastic attitude towards recycling, which 
could come to be regarded as a chore imposed by the state, rather than something 
done willingly. 
 
Blaby District Council in Leicestershire is the one example of a local authority in the 
UK that has introduced a very restricted form of variable waste charging. In 2001, it 
decreased the size of the wheeled bins it provided from 240 litres to 140 litres and 
providing a 140-litre recycling bin on request. If the refuse bin is filled before the end 
of the week, householders can buy refuse sacks from the council or pay to rent a 
larger bin for an annual fee. There is a discount for households with five or more 
people. Only 7% of households took up these options. The amount of residual waste 
collected went down and the amount of recyclables collected by the kerbside 
recycling scheme increased by 55% (Strategy Unit, 2002). 32 
Since 45% of British households now live in areas with 240 litre bin collections, the 
Blaby experience suggests that these local authorities could significantly decrease the 
amount of waste generated and promote recycling simply by copying these measures. 
However, simply reducing the capacity of bins to 140 litres would alone probably 
have a significant effect as it is believed that the large capacity of 240 litre bins 
encourages waste production. The disadvantage with such a measure is that it does not 
really create significant incentives to reduce waste production at the margin, 
particularly for smaller households. Current legislation in the UK prevents local 
councils from separately charging households for waste disposal, except for certain 
items mentioned in legislation. 
 
5. Variable waste charging and regressivity 
 
5.1 Analysing  household waste production 
 
Because household waste generation is not related to income, any kind of single-rate 
variable charge for waste generation, whether it is based on bags, stickers, volume, 
frequency or weight, will tend to be regressive. For example, if the waste charge 
averaged out at £50-100 per household across the income distribution, this would 
correspond in the average household in the lowest income decile to 1-2% of their 
expenditure, compared to less than 0.3% in the highest income decile. For those 
households in low income deciles which generated more than average amounts of 
waste, and had lower than average incomes, the waste charge percentage of their 
expenditure would be much higher. 
 
On the other hand, it could be argued that if the scheme was structured so that people 
could reduce their payments by both reducing their waste and participating in 
recycling initiatives, this would give an opportunity for low income people (and 
others) to reduce their waste charges. On the other hand it would certainly be 
politically controversial if any proposed scheme were to end up more regressive than 
the current Council Tax-funded scheme. 
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The only previously available data on waste production according to size of 
household was from a one-week survey conducted for the Environment Agency 
(University of East Anglia et al, 2000). As would be expected, larger households tend 
to produce more waste. One-person households in the study on average produced 9kg 
of waste per week, two person households 13kg, three person households 17kg, four 
person households 17kg and households with five or more 18kg. These averages hide 
huge variations between individual households and enormous overlap in the amount 
of waste produced by households of very different sizes. The amount of waste 
produced by manual and non-manual households did not vary significantly. It should 
be borne in mind that the Environment Agency’s figures are based on no kerbside 
collection of recyclables and a very low recycling rate. 
 
A better and more reliable source of data became available at the end of 2003. It 
comes from a trial by South Norfolk District Council, using lorries equipped to weigh 
the waste produced by around 3000 households in the authority. A survey was 
conducted and sufficient data was collected on 244 households for their patterns of 
waste production to be analysed. The trial was conducted with collection of recyclable 
waste (green bin) and non-recyclable waste (grey bin) on alternate weeks. Due to 
technical problems with the weighing equipment, data was only collected for all 
households on eight occasions out of a possible thirteen for each kind of waste. The 
data was kindly made available by South Norfolk District Council. The authors wish 
to express their gratitude to Dr Andrew Lovett at the University of East Anglia for 
assisting in obtaining the data, cleaning it and converting into a usable format. 
 
The 244 households provided information about the number of members of the 
household and the ages of each of them. The households’ Council Tax bands were 
already known to the local authority. Information on Council Tax bands was the only 
socio-economic variable collected. Because all the homes were in the same small area 
and there was a good spread of Council Tax bands among the sample, it can be taken 




Table  5.1  Weekly production of residual waste in kilograms according to 




















9.0 3.5  5.2  8.6  13.0  15.7  244
1  5.5  2.4 2.5 4.8  7.9 8.9 36 
2  7.2  3.2 4.1 6.5  9.9 11.7  89 
3 11.0  5.2  6.9  10.8  14.5  19.2  38 
4 12.5  7.2  8.2  11.2  15.5  18.5  55 
5 13.9  7.3  8.6  12.8  17.7  23.4  26 
 
Table 5.2  Weekly production of total waste (residual+recycled) in kilograms 




















15.0  8.1  9.6  14.4  20.1 23.0 244
1  9.9  5.6  6.3  9.2 12.3 14.8 36 
2  12.7  7.8  8.7  11.5  16.3 19.7 89 
3  16.5  9.3  11.6 16.4  20.3 24.8 38 
4  18.6  11.9 14.3 17.6  22.6 24.9 55 
5  20.5  14.0 14.4 19.4  25.3 29.1 26 
 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 above show that production of both total and residual waste varies 
considerably between households of the same size, typically around a factor of two 
between households that produce a little waste for their size and ones that produce a 
lot of waste for their size. Strikingly, one-person households at the 90
th percentile 




Additional household members lead to additional waste, but the largest change in 
terms of both residual and total waste is from a two-person household to a three-
person household, which seems to add around twice as much to waste production as 
an additional person does otherwise. 
 
Multiple regression analysis shows that as well as the size of the household, the age of 
the members affects waste production differently, for both residual and total waste. 0-
4 year olds and 25-44 year olds produce particularly large amounts of waste, 16-24 
year olds and over-65s produce particularly little, while 5-15 year olds and 45-64 year 
olds are in between. 
 
Council Tax band has absolutely no effect on total waste production in the multiple 
regression analysis, but another multiple regression analysis shows that households 
with higher Council Tax bands have a higher recycling rate. Households in higher 
Council Tax bands appear to produce slightly less residual waste than households in 
lower bands, even though the total amount of waste they produce is the same, because 
the wealthier households are recycling more. 
 
Table 5.3 below shows that the average household recycling rate was 40 per cent, but 
there was a dichotomy where one or two person households had on average a 
recycling rate of around 45 per cent, while larger households (with three, four or five 
people) had on average a recycling rate of between 34 and 35 per cent. 
 
Table 5.3  Recycling rate by size of household 
 
Size of household  Mean recycling rate (%)  N 
All 40  244 
1 46  36 
2 44  89 
3 34  38 
4 34  55 
5 35  26 
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In Table 5.4 below, the recycling rate is presented according to Council Tax band. It 
can be seen that the rate does not increase systematically through the bands.  
 
Table 5.4  Recycling rate by Council Tax band 
 
Council Tax band  Mean recycling rate (%)  N 
All 40  244 
A 39  15 
B 37  86 
C 41  89 
D 39  24 
E 45  18 
F 40  10 
G 55  2 
 
The multiple regression analysis including the size and composition of the households 
shows a stronger correlation of 0.177 (significance 0.003) between Council Tax band 
and recycling rate which is not apparent here. In the simple table above, the socio-
economic effect is masked by the fact that households in higher Council Tax band 
homes also tend to be larger and larger households tend to have lower recycling rates. 
 
The sample is too small for it to be possible to produce tables that disaggregate the 
households according to both size and Council Tax bands – the numbers of 
households in most squares would be too low to show a meaningful pattern. 
 
If a system of variable waste charging by weight was introduced for residual waste 
and Council Tax reduced by the average amount that households pay at the moment, 
then in order to obtain revenue neutrality and assuming no source reduction the effect 





Table 5.5  Gainers and losers among households of different sizes (households 
producing less or more than the mean amount of residual waste) 
with a simple system of variable waste charging by weight 
(assuming revenue neutrality and no source reduction) 
 
Number in household  Gainers (%)  Losers (%)  N 
All  57 43 244 
1 92  8  36 
2  76 24 89 
3  37 63 38 
4  30 70 55 
5  26 74 26 
 
Table 5.5 shows that most one and two person households would gain and most larger 
households would lose. The result would be a matter of some concern in terms of the 
regressive effect for larger low-income households. 
 
The effect on households in different Council Tax bands is shown in Table 5.6 below. 
 
Table 5.6  Gainers and losers among households in different Council Tax 
bands (households producing less or more than the mean amount 
of residual waste) with a simple system of variable waste charging 
by weight (assuming revenue neutrality and no source reduction) 
 
Council Tax band  Gainers (%)  Losers (%)  N 
All  57 43 244 
A  84 16 15 
B  55 45 86 
C  55 45 89 
D  39 61 24 
E  65 35 18 
F  56 44 10 
G 100  0  2 38 
Table 5.6 shows that there is no clear pattern to the progression of gainers and losers 
through the Council Tax bands. This is not surprising because multiple regression 
analysis showed that Council Tax band is not an independent predictor of household 
residual waste production. It should also be borne in mind that the proportion of 
households in each Council Tax band is particular to South Norfolk and not 
representative of the distribution found more widely. 
 
However, the concern remains about the regressive effect on larger low-income 
households. The next section discusses how that could be tackled. 
 
5.2  Reducing regressivity from variable waste charging  
 
Of the four generic types of scheme the bag/sticker option seems to have merits on 
grounds of simplicity and low administrative cost, although it is not as precise as a 
weight-based system. The introduction of a weight-based system involves the 
purchase of new vehicles and makes collection slower as the electronically chipped 
bin that each household is given has to be individually weighed. One advantage of a 
weight-based system is that it is fairer as the items that are most easily recycled (metal 
and glass) or composted (kitchen and garden waste) are much denser than difficult-to-
recycle waste such as plastic food packaging. The great advantage of a weight-based 
system is that it appears to lead to greater source reduction, particularly if biowaste 
(which tends to be dense) is charged for even if separated (although at a lower rate 
than residual waste in order to encourage separation). Even a small increase in source 
reduction appears, according to Eunomia’s estimates (Eunomia Research and 
Consulting 2003), to make a weight-based system the cheapest option on balance. 
There is a good case for households without gardens to have separated biowaste 
instead taken free of charge in order to avoid penalising them for their inability to 
engage in home composting. A sack-based system could be introduced as an interim 
measure, with a move to a weight-based system when collection vehicles were 
approaching the end of their lives anyway. 
 
It is impossible to make accurate predictions about the levels of recycling that could 
be expected nationally on the basis of a small sample like the South Norfolk one. 
Another factor to take into account is that variable charging reduces the total amount 39 
of waste households produce, both residual waste and waste for recycling. The South 
Norfolk sample was not exposed to variable waste charging even though their waste 
was weighed, so the data does not tell us what the effect of that would be in the UK. 
What the data tells us is about the distribution of waste production between individual 
households of different types and different households of the same type – information 
that was not available before. 
 
As noted above, a variable waste charging scheme would appear to be regressive in 
respect of low and high-income households which generate the same amount of waste. 
It would also penalise (perhaps unfairly) large households, which inevitably tend to 
generate more waste than small ones. Another issue is that making the charges cover 
the increased cost of more sustainable waste management means that a larger 
proportion of households would lose (because overall costs would have to rise). 
However, the reduction in waste production because of variable charging would at 
least partially offset the additional costs of more sustainable waste management and 
any consequent financial losses. Nonetheless, at present UK costs for residual waste 
disposal, the expected reduction in total waste production could not be expected to 
entirely offset the cost of the increased recycling that variable waste charging would 
lead to. Using Eunomia’s figures, the average cost per household of waste 
management might be expected to rise to around £70 under pessimistic assumptions. 
Eunomia has calculated that, if the recycling rate was raised to around 30%, the 
average cost per household would rise to about £70 per year. If there was variable 
waste charging then less waste would be produced and a recycling rate of around 45% 
could be achieved for about £70 per year (Eunomia Research and Consulting 2003). 
Since the present costs of household waste management are about £1.2 billion per 
year, that is equivalent to an increase of about £500 million to £1.7 billion per year. 
As the Strategy Unit recognised, at least this kind of increase in expenditure will be 
necessary in order to meet the requirements of the Landfill Directive. If this increase 
in expenditure was to be funded through Council Tax at the same proportions of local 
to central government revenues as at present, central government would need to fund 
£375 million (three quarters) of the £500 million increase. 
 
In any switch to variable waste charging, it would seem desirable that Council Tax 
bills should show the deduction from Council Tax of the entire waste charge, in order 40 
to counter pervasive public perceptions of ‘double taxation’ or ‘double charging’ 
when variable waste charges are introduced. This would involve all households 
receiving the same reduction, whether they are in Band A or Band H – a progressive 
tax change, as noted above. 
 
In order to counter the potential regressivity of the variable waste charge, those who 
are entitled to Council Tax Benefit could receive a payment equivalent to the average 
waste charge (varying according to local authority) to help with their waste costs. 
With electronic payment of benefits, this would be very easy to set up. 
 
A potential problem with relying on Council Tax Benefit alone is that it only reaches 
a proportion of low-income people. Even many people on benefits are not eligible for 
it.  
 
The amount of waste that households produce varies according to size. If it is 
assumed, as discussed above, that average waste costs will rise to £70 per year and the 
charges are per kilogram of residual waste then on average (and assuming no waste 
reduction) one-person households will pay £43 and on average couples will pay £56. 
If we assume that they have on average received a deduction of £50 in their council 
tax bill, the result is a difference of less than 15p per week either way. 
 
In order to protect larger low-income households, it would be necessary to provide 
extra benefits for additional members. The average waste bill for a three-person 
household would be about £85 per year, so an additional £35 a year would be needed 
to compensate them. The average cost for each of the fourth and fifth members of a 
household would be about £12 per year. To compensate, 50p per week could be added 
to Child Tax Credit for all families on benefits and low to medium incomes. The cost 
of an increase of 50p a week would be approximately £165 million per annum. This 
would ensure that, on average, larger low-income households did not lose out from 
variable charging. 
 
Most households on benefits probably have the time to properly sort their waste for 
recycling and so should be able to reduce their waste bill more effectively than other 
households. However, since it is known from the Environment Agency one-week 41 
study that households in lower social classes tend to eat more packaged food and less 
fresh food, they may still produce more packaging waste. One-person households at 
the 80
th percentile in their production of residual waste would lose about £11 per year 
and two-person households at the 80
th percentile of residual waste would lose about 
£27 per year. If there was serious concern about the impact on those at the upper end 
of the waste distribution curve, there could be an increase of 25p per single person, 
and 50p per couple in Income Support, Job-Seeker’s Allowance and Pension Credit, 
and in Working Tax Credit by 25p per claim. That would cost about £150 million per 
year.
v However, it is not clear that this would be necessary, since even most two-
person households would not lose without any such benefit increases. 
 
However, in order to protect larger low-income households, it would be necessary to 
provide extra benefits for additional members. The average waste bill for a three-
person household would be about £85 per year, so an additional £35 a year would be 
needed to compensate them. The average extra cost for each of the fourth and fifth 
members of a household would be about £12 per year. To compensate, 50p per week 
could be added to Child Tax Credit for all families on benefits and low incomes. 
Based on the costs quoted by the Institute of Fiscal Studies for increasing Child Tax 
Credit by £3 per week, the cost of increasing it by 50p a week would be 
approximately £165 million per annum (Child Poverty Action Group, 2003). 
 
If the intention was that no household below the 80
th percentile would lose out, then 
the increase in Child Tax Credit would be slightly higher at 65p per child, costing 
about £215 million per annum. Child Tax Credit is not an efficient way of targeting 
only low income households because the withdrawal rate is low and many households 
on quite high incomes are eligible for some money. Another problem is that there is 
currently poor take-up of tax credits among working families (about 70%), although 
take-up is higher among those most in need and lower among those least in need. 
However, using universal Child Benefit would cost much more and give money to 
many families with no need.  
 
It can be seen that the introduction of such a variable charging scheme to create a 
more sustainable waste management system while protecting the poorest households 
from additional cost on average would involve increasing the social security budget 42 
by around £165 million per annum. If the intention was that 80 percent would not lose 
out even if they changed their waste disposal habits no more than other members of 
society, then the cost would be about £365 million per annum, for increases in means-
tested benefits (£150 million) and Child Tax Credit (£215 million). 
 
It may be noted that, under this scheme, central government would be spending 
through the benefits system about the same as the £375 million it would need to spend 
in support grants to local authorities to cover the additional costs of higher recycling  
rates, if these were to be funded through Council Tax. In reality, without variable 
charging, central government, local authorities and ultimately taxpayers would have 
to spend far more on waste management and probably still fail to meet the 
requirements of the Landfill Directive because the growth in waste production is 
unlikely to be restrained without it. 
 
The biggest problem with using the benefits system as a compensation mechanism is 
that it works on a national level. The actual charges in different local authority areas 
will vary, so households in areas where the increases in charges are higher than 
average could still lose out. It would also be difficult to roll out variable charging in 
all areas simultaneously, so there would be anomalies if benefits were uprated while 
some localities had variable charging and others did not yet. 
 
These calculations are based on the assumption that the entire cost of waste services 
moves to a per-kilogram or per-sack system. If there was instead a fixed charge for 
collection and a per-kilogram or per-sack charge on top of that then the distributional 
consequence would be that one and two person households would pay rather more and 
larger households would pay rather less. It would also reduce the marginal incentive 
for source reduction. 
 
If a more sustainable waste management system is introduced without variable waste 
charging as an incentive for active participation, then if the additional costs are borne 
across all Council Tax payers, the very poorest households will be protected from 
increases through Council Tax benefit, but the rest of the additional cost will be 
shared fairly evenly among all Council Tax payers in most local authorities. It would 
be necessary to increase other benefits and working tax credits to prevent an effect 43 
from increases in the regressive Council Tax. A simpler way to avoid regressivity 
would be for central government to cover the additional cost out of general taxation. 
 
An important additional factor needs to be considered. Variable waste charging 
encourages waste reduction in a way that mandatory recycling or incentive payments 
for recycling do not. Waste reduction is better environmentally than recycling. It is 
also cheaper to achieve. Although it was not possible to model this in this project, it is 
likely that the savings to society from waste reduction due to variable waste charging 
are likely to outweigh the additional cost to the social security system of a 
compensation mechanism to protect families on low incomes from additional 
expenditure. 
 
Given the low participation levels that kerbside recycling in the UK has, it is clear that 
something radical needs to be done to meet the kind of targets that the Strategy Unit 
has recommended. A variable waste charging scheme of the kind outlined here would 





In order to reduce the amount of residual waste sent to landfill and increase recycling, 
and in the absence of considerable new financial support from central government, it 
is likely that waste disposal charges will need to increase substantially. If these 
increased charges are applied through the current charging mechanism - the Council 
Tax - then they will have a regressive effect, because the Council Tax is regressive. 
Moreover, the increase in charges would, like the current flat-rate waste disposal 
charge, do nothing to incentivise householders either to reduce their waste or to 
cooperate with recycling schemes. 
 
Variable waste charging provides an incentive for both kinds of behaviour, and 
experience in other countries has shown that it can be expected to result in both waste 
reduction and an increase in the separation of recyclables. A potential concern about 
its introduction in the UK is that it might have a disproportionate impact on poor 
households, because the generation of household waste bears little relation to income, 44 
and more affluent households tend to recycle more, thereby reducing their residual 
waste which would bear the charge. 
 
If waste charging was removed from Council Tax by reducing the Council Tax for all 
households by the same amount (the average per household cost of waste collection 
and disposal), this would be progressive (i.e. poorer households would be 
proportionately better off compared to richer households). If a revenue-neutral 
variable weight-based charge was then introduced for all households, and there was 
no waste reduction, 92% of single-person households, and 76% of two-person 
households, would be better off, while most larger households would be net losers. 
Clearly more households of all sizes would be losers if the charges were set at a level 
to raise more revenue than is paid at present through the Council Tax, in order to 
cover the extra costs of increased recycling. 
 
In the revenue-neutral case, with no source reduction, effective compensation for the 
extra waste disposal costs could be given through the benefit system to the great 
majority of households on means-tested benefits. The cost of compensating all those 
up to the 80
th percentile of waste generation is estimated at £365 million per annum. 
Central government would be spending through the benefits system about the same as 
the £375 million it would need to spend in support grants to local authorities to cover 
the additional costs of higher recycling rates, if these were to be funded through 
Council Tax. 
 
Of course, all households could reduce their waste disposal costs by reducing the 
amount of residual waste they generate, both by producing less waste in the first place 
and by separating out more waste for recycling. If these effects were pronounced 
(especially the former), then it is quite possible, on the basis of experience in other 
countries, that total waste disposal costs, and therefore total waste charges, would fall 
from their present level, thereby significantly reducing concerns about regressivity 
from the change in the charging system. Of course, it would be open to individual 
households to reduce their own waste charges in this way whether or not other 
households did so as well. Given that, unlike energy and water use for example, there 
is no obvious ‘basic needs’ level of waste generation, there would seem to be fewer 
arguments (assuming that convenient and effective recycling facilities have been 45 
introduced) why households could not radically reduce their waste in order to reduce 
their exposure to variable waste charges. It is also not clear how, in the absence of 
such charges, it will be possible even to curb the growth of household waste in the 
UK, let alone reduce such waste from its present level. On the other hand, if 
household waste could be reduced, then the lower waste disposals could offset 
partially or completely the extra benefits needed to protect low-income households 
from the higher variable waste charges that have helped to bring it about. 46 
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